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INTRODUCTION
One underappreciated cost of constitutional rights enforcement
is moral hazard. In economics, moral hazard refers to the increased
propensity of insured individuals to engage in costly behavior.1 This
Essay concerns what I call “constitutional moral hazard,” defined as
the use of constitutional rights (or their conspicuous absence) to
shield potentially destructive behavior from moral or pragmatic
assessment.2 What I have in mind here is not simply the risk that
people will make poor decisions when they have a right to do so, but
that people may, at times, make poor decisions because they have a
right.3 Moral hazard is not about how individuals behave in general
but on the margins. It concerns the incentive effect of holding
security against worst-case scenarios.
Thus, imagine a D.C. parent who, inspired by the Supreme
Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,4 keeps a loaded
handgun within reach of a toddler. A significant risk of injury to the
child is present whether or not handgun possession is constitution-
ally protected.5 But, on the margins, the risky behavior may be more
likely to occur if prosecution for illegal possession is off the table. Or
consider a homeowner who refuses to sell his or her home for an
economic development project at a price that he or she would accept
in the absence of property protections under the Takings Clause.6
The free speech guarantees the First Amendment confers are
especially vulnerable to this kind of incentive effect. Courts have
interpreted the First Amendment to impose nearly absolute
1. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
531, 535 (1968).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part I.
4. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
5. See Dylan Matthews, Living in a House with a Gun Increases Your Odds of Death, VOX
(Nov. 14, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/10/1/18000520/gun-risk-death [https://
perma.cc/5K53-DX8N] (explaining the high rate of firearm accidents among children in the
United States).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court construed the “public use” requirement
of the Takings Clause liberally in its decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
480-85 (2005), but it still imposes constraints, and its analog has been interpreted more
strictly under some state constitutions. See City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115,
1138-39 (Ohio 2006); R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 104 (R.I. 2006).
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protection for speakers from state discrimination on the basis of the
content or viewpoint of their speech.7 At the same time, individuals
who engage in provocative speech often do so precisely to garner
attention, so ordinary counterspeech or other legally available
methods to bring such speakers in line with social norms can prove
counterproductive.8 Speech whose provocative character would
otherwise need to be defended on the merits can be defended as a
conspicuous exercise of constitutional rights in light of courts’
interpretation of the First Amendment. That posture can then
encourage counterspeakers to be equally or more provocative, or else
to eschew the law altogether and resort to forms of civil or even
violent disobedience.9
This Essay offers some observations on how to escape this cycle
with particular reference to racist or other provocative speech on
college campuses. No one is satisfied with the state of play here.
Conservatives argue that university life is dominated by liberal
professors and administrators who protect cloistered left-wing
students from hearing opinions they do not agree with.10 Progres-
sives counter that right-wing campus groups are not interested in
dialogue, but rather seek to recruit provocateurs to assault minori-
ties and women with hate speech.11 Both sides press their case ag-
gressively and do so in the language of free expression—the freedom
to offer controversial opinions on the one hand and the freedom to
engage in collective, effective counterspeech on the other.12 What is
7. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., Bret Stephens, Diversity, Inclusion and Anti-Excellence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/opinion/university-campus-diversity-inclusion-
free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/BB4A-ZNX5].
11. See, e.g., Sean McElwee, Political Correctness Isn’t the Problem, THE OUTLINE (Nov.
20, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://theoutline.com/post/2503/political-correctness-isn-t-the-problem
[https://perma.cc/H8H7-6CRM].
12. See Larry Atkins, There Should Be Free Speech on College Campuses for Conservative
Students, Conservative Speakers and Liberal Professors, HUFFPOST (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/there-should-be-free-speech-on-college-campuses-
for_b_59a4144fe4b0a62d0987b0b3 [https://perma.cc/B3YP-VB8B] (“Universities should en-
courage political debate in classrooms and bring speakers of all ideologies to speak on
campus.”); Jared Sellick, There Is No Place for Hate Speech on Our Campus, ORACLE (Feb. 20,
2019), http://www.usforacle.com/2019/02/20/there-is-no-place-for-hate-speech-on-our-campus
[https://perma.cc/D323-KJ92] (“If this organization’s presence is persistent on campus and
they continue to disperse information designed to encourage students to harass and report
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more, for both sides, the language of free expression is not just
consistent with, but is motivated by, an idealized vision of univer-
sity life.13
As Part I discusses, the danger of moral hazard varies with the
proportion of risk borne by third parties. Speech can be produced at
a low cost relative to other activities. And even bracketing the
potential harm to those who feel burdened or threatened by racist
speech, the potential for violence in response to such speech im-
poses, at times, significant economic costs on universities and law
enforcement agencies. Those costs are not internalized by the speak-
ers, who are often seeking exactly the attention that visible security
measures produce.
Part II establishes what is already well-known to constitutional
scholars, namely that the First Amendment is not absolute. Neither
the constitutional text, nor constitutional history, nor even constitu-
tional doctrine establish that the First Amendment is incapable of
being sensitive to the institutional context in which speech takes
place. Moreover, and contrary to some conventional wisdom, un-
bridled freedom of speech is ill-suited to a university setting. As
Part III elaborates, from admissions decisions, to pedagogical
choices, to the hiring of faculty and administrators, universities are
quintessential curators of speech. In an information environment in
which citizens can expect to be flooded with data that is either
indiscriminate or calculated to mislead, it is more important than
ever for educational institutions to serve their essential function.
Finally, and most significantly, Part IV argues that universities
nonetheless should permit provocative speakers on campus. Many
of the reasons asserted for permitting such speakers—the line-
drawing problems, the capacity for incidents to act as teachable
moments, the importance of inculcating tolerance, and so forth14—
other [sic] one another, it should be expected that USF takes swift and decisive action to get
these hateful messages off of our campus.”).
13. See, e.g., Sebastian Grandias, Dear College: Reject This Tale of Two World Views,
MIDDLEBURY CAMPUS (Apr. 25, 2019), https://middleburycampus.com/44727/opinion/dear-
college-reject-this-tale-of-two-world-views/ [https://perma.cc/5T7K-JSBB] (“Freedom of speech,
freedom of inquiry, freedom of academic exploration are on one side.... On the other side is the
hope that colleges and universities will not sponsor such dehumanizing ideologies by giving
their proponents this kind of unchallenged stage.”).
14. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Free Expression on Campus: Mitigating the Costs of
Contentious Speakers, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 166-70 (2018).
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are persuasive. The point, though, is that these considerations are
best understood not as interpretive arguments about constitutional
free speech guarantees but rather as merits arguments in favor of
a permissive campus speech policy. Colleges and universities,
whether public or private, should have the discretion to reject these
arguments in favor of more interventionist approaches. They should
also have the discretion to experiment with different approaches to
security costs for provocative speech. That is, rejecting or canceling
a speaker because of a school’s inability to afford security born of a
predictive concern about the behavior of protesters should be
permitted under the First Amendment, notwithstanding long-
standing suspicion of allowing a “heckler’s veto.”15 This posture
creates an incentive for individuals and groups to engage in or
threaten disruptive acts,16 and so carries its own risk of moral
hazard, but whether to abide that risk should fall within a univer-
sity’s discretion.
That discretion is appropriate as a matter of first principles in
light of the role colleges and universities play in public life.17 The
discourse of rights in campus policy debates distracts students from
the need to persuade each other of the merits of their arguments.18
Building some distance from that discourse is also helpful in devel-
oping best practices around campus speech, permitting policy
experimentation otherwise choked off by a more absolutist approach
to free speech.19
There is a broader point. We are accustomed to thinking about
the risk that a government unconstrained by rights will abuse its
power. Lee Bollinger emphasized the importance of guarding
against this danger in the realm of freedom of speech.20 For
Bollinger, we answer this challenge by “giv[ing] judges as little room
to maneuver as possible ... [by] extend[ing] the boundary of the
realm of protected speech into the hinterlands of speech in order to
minimize the potential harm from judicial miscalculation and
15. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 140, 142 (1992) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
16. See Goldberg, supra note 14, at 184-85.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See Goldberg, supra note 14, at 166-69.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 78 (1986).
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misdeeds.”21 Vincent Blasi discussed freedom of speech in similar
terms, writing that “the overriding objective at all times should be
to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those
historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most
prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to
stifle dissent systematically.”22 Blasi has termed this point of view
“the pathological perspective,”23 and it is as powerful an idea within
First Amendment law as anywhere else.
But the conferral of a right is itself a grant of, at times, extraordi-
nary power to contravene the wishes of public officials or other
members of one’s community.24 There are pathologies evident within
this practice as well, and they warrant our attention. Our free
speech paradigm is an inheritance from the 1960s, a period of rad-
ical social and political change.25 Free and often provocative speech
was an engine of that transformation, and college campuses were an
important site of such speech.26 There is good reason, though, for the
form of constitutional law to match the kinds of conflicts it is
typically, rather than aberrationally, called to police. Curating
speech might be not only appropriate, but also necessary in a world
in which speech is not scarce but is abundant and paralyzing.
Colleges are precisely the institutional actors to experiment with
the policy choices appropriate to a twenty-first century social and
technological environment. Free speech doctrine should give them
the space to do so.
I. A DEFINITION
Moral hazard has its conceptual origins in the insurance busi-
ness. For nineteenth-century fire insurers, Tom Baker writes, a
moral hazard could apply either to individuals or to situations.27
21. Id.
22. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 449-50 (1985).
23. Id. at 449.
24. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of
Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 279 (2010).
25. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
27. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 250 (1996).
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According to Baker, “[t]he ‘moral’ insured was honest, careful,
chaste, thrifty, hard working, moderate in habits, and ... did not
gamble.”28 Situations giving rise to moral hazard were those that
increased the temptation to engage in behavior that caused loss.29
Early uses of the term meant precisely to emphasize its normative
dimensions, and indeed, identifying someone as a “moral hazard”
formed the basis for an outright refusal to insure.30
The term migrated into the economic theory literature in the
1960s when Kenneth Arrow discussed moral hazard in the context
of medical insurance.31 Arrow observed that the cost of medical care
depends not just on the nature of the illness, which we can assume
is unpredictable, but also on the choice of doctor and the decision of
which medical services to pursue.32 Such decisions are at least
partly within the patient’s control and can be expected to be more
extravagant if a third party bears the cost.33 In an influential reply
to Arrow, Mark Pauly emphasized that the decision to seek more
medical care in the presence of insurance was “a result not of moral
perfidy, but of rational economic behavior.”34 In an ordinary insur-
ance model, “the cost of the individual’s excess usage is spread over
all other purchasers of that insurance,” and so “the individual is not
prompted to restrain his usage of care.”35 The upshot is that even in
an ideal competitive environment, the optimal level of insurance
would not be full insurance if—as in a moral hazard situation—the
fact of insurance influences its cost.36
Arrow’s response to Pauly’s point about the morality of moral
hazard is worth mention, as it bears upon this Essay’s themes.
Noting that “moral perfidy” and “rational economic behavior” are
not mutually exclusive in this context, Arrow wrote that, even if
seeking additional medical care because one is insured is rational,
28. Id. at 249.
29. See id. at 250-51.
30. See id. at 251, 253; Pauly, supra note 1, at 535. Insuring people who posed moral
hazards was sometimes equated to gambling. See Baker, supra note 27, at 254-55.
31. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 961 (1963).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Pauly, supra note 1, at 535.
35. Id.
36. See id.
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“[i]t does not follow that no constraints ought to be imposed or
indeed that in certain contexts individuals should not impose
constraints on themselves.”37 An incentive to spend as much as one
wants to on medical care with a third party bearing the cost does
not lead to a socially optimal allocation of resources, and so, Arrow
argued, it makes some sense for insurance companies to exercise
some cost control.38 This regulation could occur through auditing, by
leaning on “the professional ethics of physicians,” or by relying on
“the willingness of the individual to behave in accordance with some
commonly accepted norms.”39
We can translate some of these insights into the very different
context of constitutional rights enforcement. To the degree the
behavior rights protect is costly to engage in, rights protection of
course imposes social costs. These costs may be understood as
simply the wages of living in a rights-respecting society. Certain
forms of discrimination—on the basis of race, sex, religion, and so
forth—are not permitted even if the discriminatory acts are
economically efficient and a net positive under some utilitarian
calculus.40 Americans may keep loaded handguns in their homes
even if it increases the risk of a tragic outcome.41 The most extreme
example in the free-speech domain may be the disfavoring of the so-
called “heckler’s veto.”42 Speech is not to be suppressed on the basis
of the illegal, violent, or aggressive acts of a hostile audience, even
if protecting the speaker from the audience imposes significant
costs.43 Heckler’s veto doctrine arose out of the civil rights move-
ment, in which civil rights protesters frequently faced threats from
potentially violent mobs of resistors.44
Constitutional moral hazard is not about these first-order costs.
What it aims at instead is the marginal cost imposed by the
presence of the rights regime itself. What it contemplates is an
37. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 537, 538 (1968).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1977).
41. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
42. See Reno v. ALCU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997).
43. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992).
44. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 550 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 231 (1963).
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individual who engages in protected behavior at least in part
because the behavior is protected. It would encompass, for example,
a white student who seeks admission to a school for which he or she
is not a good fit, because he or she wishes to challenge the school’s
race-based affirmative action policy. And there are countless
examples of individuals acting carelessly with guns in order to make
a point about gun rights.45
There is good reason to think an analogous response especially
tempting in the context of freedom of speech. We need not generally
assume that most people are Holmesian bad men,46 even as the
pejorative adjective “moral” sounds bracing and accusatory.47 In the
context of speech, however, not only is the underlying behavior of-
ten cheap, but the social cost is often hidden or even, from the per-
spective of the speaker, desirable.48 We may assume that at least
some challengers to affirmative action programs do not specifically
intend to damage the academic prospects of minority students. We
may assume that those who tote guns to flaunt their Second
Amendment rights do not intend to kill or injure people. By
contrast, provocative speakers often want, specifically, to offend
their targets, to alter the nature of public discourse, and to trigger
a public response.49
As in insurance markets, a rational response to constitutional
moral hazard would be incomplete coverage; that is, rights that are
not absolute but depend on some cost-benefit analysis. Generalizing
from Arrow’s discussion of medical insurance markets,50 it might be
45. See, e.g., Marwa Eltagouri, The Story Behind the Viral Photo of a Kent State Graduate
Posing with Her Cap—and a Rifle, WASH. POST (May 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/grade-point/wp/2018/05/16/the-story-behind-the-viral-photo-of-a-kent-state-
graduate-posing-with-her-cap-and-a-rifle/ [https://perma.cc/A6KX-7QBU].
46. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good
one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.”).
47. See Pauly, supra note 1, at 535.
48. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 14, at 168; John A. Tures, Have Professional Pro-
vocateurs Hurt Colleges and Conservatives?, HUFFPOST (July 18, 2017, 10:50 AM), https://
www.huffpost.com/entry/have-professional-provocateurs-hurt-colleges-and-conserva tives_b_
596e1fb9e4b05561da5a5ab8 [https://perma.cc/9T2D-RX7P].
49. See Pauly, supra note 1, at 535.
50. See Arrow, supra note 37, at 538.
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appropriate for courts (here standing in for insurance companies) to
make contextual judgments about the exercise of free speech on
campus or for universities (here analogized to physicians) to refer
to their own institutional norms to limit potentially costly speech.
And, as in the context of medical insurance, we would ordinarily
want to rely on social norms to encourage rights bearers to self-
regulate.51
An initial question for this Essay’s area of concern, then, is
whether we should understand positive, constitutional law to pre-
clude these kinds of responses to constitutional moral hazard in the
particular case of freedom of speech on public university campuses.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S LIMITS
The First Amendment addresses freedom of speech in its first
clause: “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.”52 Some commentators have taken this language to suggest
that the First Amendment codifies a nearly absolute right against
government interference with one’s ability to speak freely.53
Analysis of this sort is especially common in comparative work that
seeks an explanation for the robust protections U.S. courts give to
freedom of speech as compared to other courts around the world.54
The United States’ protection of hate speech and its high bar for
liability for acts of defamation against public figures is sometimes
said to be baked into the language of the Constitution.55
This view is mistaken for several reasons. For one thing, a com-
mitted textualist would have to concede that the language of the
First Amendment itself does not support absolute protection against
government interference with speech. Consider, for example, that
the language is addressed to Congress, not to states, executive
51. See id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960); Wilkinson,
supra note 24, at 278.
54. See, e.g., Robert Danay, Copyright vs. Free Expression: The Case of Peer-to-Peer File-
Sharing of Music in the United Kingdom, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 32, 42-43 (2006); Edward J.
Eberle, The Architecture of First Amendment Free Speech, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1191, 1196-
97.
55. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 54, at 1197.
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branch officials, or judges.56 The First Amendment applies to each
of these other institutional categories, and they encompass the vast
majority of First Amendment cases,57 but any basis on which the
clause might do so absolutely (or nearly so) must be extratextual.
Specifically, the doctrinal route through which freedom of speech
applies to state and local actors is the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.58 Textually, due process is flexible, requiring a
calibration between the substance, weight, and scope of the
infringed interest and the process that attends its deprivation. As
Justice Felix Frankfurter has explained, giving content to the Due
Process Clause requires “striking [a] balance [which] implies the
exercise of judgment.”59 Of course, incorporation of the First
Amendment against the states presupposes that free speech rights
are in some sense “fundamental,”60 and—at a broad level of
generality—that is surely right. But, just as surely, the First
Amendment’s full scope extends well beyond rights that are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”61 We can only make sense of First
Amendment doctrine if particular applications of the general con-
cept of freedom of speech need not meet these tests. The rights to
market pharmaceuticals to doctors,62 to use the corporate form to
spend unlimited general treasury sums on electioneering,63 or to
refuse to contribute to the collective bargaining expenditures of the
public sector union that negotiates one’s employment contract are
not “fundamental” in any sense that is respectful of language.64
It almost goes without saying that a view of freedom of speech as
absolute does not derive from any examination of original meaning
or intentions. The best evidence remains that informed members of
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 477, 477-83 (1993); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 449 (1969); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952).
58. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
59. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
the result).
60. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010).
61. Id. at 764 n.11, 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
62. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
63. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19 (2010).
64. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Empls., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2459-60 (2018).
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the founding generation did not regard even criminal liability for
political speech as necessarily an abridgement of the freedom of
speech.65 That generation was more concerned with prior restraints
on speech,66 which, unlike ex post liability, had the effect of denying
the jury a role in assigning criminal sanctions.67 In that sense, the
First Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, was, at the
time, better understood as a federalism provision than as an in-
dividual rights provision. The incorporation of the First Amendment
against the states did not occur doctrinally until the 1930s,68 and its
presumptively absolute protection is an artifact of post-1960s
jurisprudence.69
I do not mean to resist certain clear propositions of U.S. free
speech law. The Supreme Court has not used substantive due pro-
cess as the vehicle for articulating the scope of free speech protec-
tion as applied to state and local governments. Assimilating
incorporation and substantive due process in this way was the
preferred path of Justice John Marshall Harlan,70 but it has been
rejected in favor of “selective incorporation.”71 Under selective in-
corporation, because the rights the First Amendment protects are
fundamental (at a high level of generality), the amendment applies
to the states in just the same way it applies to the federal govern-
ment.72 But the key point, for this Essay’s purposes, is that this
doctrinal reality does not simply follow syllogistically from any
textual or historical proposition.73 It reflects a set of choices that
65. See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 247-48 (1960).
66. See id. at 216-17.
67. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 23-24
(1998).
68. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Stromburg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 368 (1931).
69. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that prohibition of
incitement requires finding an intention and likelihood of imminent lawless action);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (upholding a prosecution for group libel);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (upholding a federal statute outlawing
advocacy of violent overthrow of the government).
70. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 295-98 (1982).
72. See id. at 253.
73. See id. at 336.
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courts have made over time and that did not solidify until relatively
recently.74
The First Amendment cannot be absolute in practice, even as to
practices that are concededly speech. Speech can be admitted as
evidence of a crime, as in conspiracy cases or hate crime prosecu-
tions.75 A doctor who intentionally misdiagnoses a patient can be
sued for malpractice.76 A magazine that prints falsehoods that dam-
age an individual’s reputation can be found guilty of libel.77 An
employer can, through speech, sexually harass a coworker or create
a hostile work environment.78 These are analogs to Justice Holmes’s
famous “falsely shouting fire in a theatre” hypothetical79: speech can
cause harm, and sometimes in such instances we choose to label it
as action. The choice to do so does not recognize a prepolitical
category or existential reality; it simply tracks the social meanings
embodied within the law.
Speech is not absolute even when it is not harmful in itself.
Freedom of speech is no society’s highest value, and so restrictions
on speech can, in rare cases, be deemed to satisfy strict scrutiny: if
they serve a compelling state interest to which they are narrowly
tailored. The most prominent recent example is Holder v. Humani-
tarian Law Project, where the Court upheld application of the USA
PATRIOT Act’s prohibition on material support to foreign terrorist
organizations to a nongovernmental organization that proposed to
assist certain groups in seeking peaceful resolutions to political
conflicts.80 Noting that “the Government’s interest in combating
terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order,”81 Chief Justice
Roberts wrote for the majority that Congress had good reason to
74. See id. at 336-38.
75. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1993); Martin H. Redish &
Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76 ALA. L. REV. 697, 697, 709
(2013).
76. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 44-45 (2012).
77. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-49 (1974).
78. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
79. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
80. 561 U.S. 1, 7-8, 40 (2010).
81. Id. at 28.
236 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:223
believe that even peaceful support for terrorist organizations would
help them advance more malevolent objectives.82
Significantly, the compelling interest test does not require govern-
ment interests to be stated in a constitutional register. It permits
free speech to be limited based on an assessment of values external
to the First Amendment and even to the Constitution.83 And so, how
we imagine free speech rests on a set of choices we make—and that
courts make, in particular—about which activities are worth
pursuing and which institutions society should support.
III. UNIVERSITIES AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
In February 2017, the right-wing writer and provocateur Milo
Yiannopoulos canceled a scheduled speech at UC Berkeley after left-
wing activists threw Molotov cocktails, set fires, and caused around
$100,000 in property damage in protest.84 Making good on a vow,
Yiannopoulos returned to Berkeley later that year as part of his self-
promoted “Free Speech Week,” for which the school prepared to
spend more than $1 million on security.85 The event was a flop.86
Yiannopoulos’s antics provide just one example among many
involving race-baiting provocateurs that have made the news in
recent years. Two months after Yiannopoulos was shouted down at
Berkeley, white nationalist and Nazi sympathizer Richard Spencer
was the beneficiary of an order from an Alabama district court
requiring Auburn University to permit him to speak there.87 The
82. See id. at 29.
83. See, e.g., id. at 28-29 (finding that Congress’s concerns regarding terrorism were a
compelling interest).
84. See Rachel Chason, Berkeley’s Mayor Asked UC Berkeley to Cancel Milo Yiannopoulos
Speech. The School Said No, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/30/berkeleys-mayor-asked-uc-berkeley-to-cancel-milo-yian
nopoulos-the-university-said-no/ [https://perma.cc/3WWC-X766]; Katy Steinmetz, Fighting
Words: A Battle in Berkeley Over Free Speech, TIME (June 1, 2017), http://time.com/4800813/
battle-berkeley-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/6R6T-SK95].
85. See Katy Steinmetz, Milo Yiannopoulos Finally Spoke at Berkeley. But the Protests
Were Louder, TIME (Sept. 24, 2017), http://time.com/4955245/milo-yiannopoulos-berkeley-free-
speech-week/ [https://perma.cc/22ZK-8LEF].
86. See id.
87. See Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-cv-231-WKW, 2017 WL 10241386, at *1 (M.D.
Ala. Apr. 18, 2017). It is noteworthy that the proliferation of incidents of this sort has been
categorized under the rubric of “campus speech,” but that label seems rather like saying the
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judge’s order in the case dutifully recited the First Amendment case
law to the effect that “discrimination on the basis of message
content cannot be tolerated” and “listeners’ reaction to speech is not
a content-neutral basis for regulation.”88 The opinion made no
reference to Auburn’s status as a university; the reasoning assumed
that the school was just like any other state agency or public
official.89
While far from universal, courts and commentators have often
treated the campuses of public colleges and universities as essen-
tially public fora with no constraining institutional status or rules
of access.90 There are hints of this view in the well-known 1957
Supreme Court case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire.91 Paul Sweezy
was a University of New Hampshire economics professor who was
held in contempt and jailed for defying a subpoena to appear before
a state subversive activities inquiry.92 The Court reversed the
contempt conviction.93 In holding that the Attorney General of New
Hampshire lacked authority under the Due Process Clause to
compel Sweezy’s appearance, Chief Justice Warren described aca-
demic freedom in dramatic terms:
Civil War was about “states’ rights.” The interesting question was what the states wanted a
right to do. Here, likewise, the controversy is as much over campus speech as it is over
campus racism. See John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and
Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9, 11-12 (1996). To be sure, these incidents are not about racism in some
abstract sense, just as the Civil War was not about slavery in the abstract: the racism here
is mediated and weaponized through the medium of speech. But we should be clear that it is
“racism” and not “speech” that makes the incidents controversial. If Richard Spencer were
doing something other than speaking, protesters would be more, not less agitated.
88. See Padgett, 2017 WL 10241386, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)).
89. Private institutions are not immune from these controversies. My home institution,
Columbia University, witnessed protests in 2017 over campus speeches delivered by anti-
Islamic activist Tommy Robinson and alt-right conspiracy theorist Mike Cernovich, both of
whom were invited by the College Republicans. See Kate Huangpu & Peter Maroulis, As
Hundreds Protest Outside, Mike Cernovich’s Columbia Speech Goes on as Planned, COLUM.
DAILY SPECTATOR (Oct. 31, 2017, 3:39 AM), https://www.columbiaspectator.com/news/2017/
10/31/as-hundreds-protest-outside-mike-cernovichs-columbia-speech-goes-on-as-planned/
[https://perma.cc/VW78-6TCG].
90. See Goldberg, supra note 14, at 172-73 (“[C]ourts have not held that educators’ discre-
tion extends to excluding invited speakers based on the views those speakers might express.”).
91. 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957).
92. See id. at 243-45.
93. See id. at 254-55.
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The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide
and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation.... Teachers and students must
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.94
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Sweezy quotes at length
a statement by a group of prominent South African academics then
responding to the government’s proposed racial segregation of the
nation’s universities95:
In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to
an end. A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it
becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A
university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal
being the ideal of Socrates—“to follow the argument where it
leads.” This implies the right to examine, question, modify or
reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are
incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is
repugnant to the spirit of a university. The concern of its
scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an
accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the
framework itself.96
The Sweezy case did not concern campus speech or the university as
a regulator but, rather, the academic freedom of the university and
its faculty in the face of government intimidation.97 The broader
political context of the case was McCarthyism and (as Justice
Frankfurter sought to make clear by citing an anti-apartheid
94. Id. at 250.
95. See Rosaan Krüger, The Genesis and Scope of Academic Freedom in the South African
Constitution, in 8 KAGISANO: ACADEMIC FREEDOM 5, 7 (2013), https://www.che.ac.za/sites/
default/files/publications/kagisano_no_8_march_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4ND-7SCX].
96. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (quoting THE
OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10-12).
97. See id. at 249-50.
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statement) the burgeoning civil rights movement.98 Yet, language of
this sort has migrated into the very different context of the rights of
students or even off-campus speakers as against university officials
seeking to limit their speech.
The tension between these different contexts is evident in Doe v.
University of Michigan, the best known of a series of judicial
decisions addressing so-called “speech codes” at public universities
in the 1980s.99 Over a three-year stretch, the University experienced
a number of disturbing incidents of racial harassment:
For example, on January 27, 1987, unknown persons distributed
a flier declaring “open season” on blacks, which it referred to as
“saucer lips, porch monkeys, and jigaboos.” On February 4, 1987,
a student disc jockey at an on-campus radio station allowed
racist jokes to be broadcast. At a demonstration protesting these
incidents, a Ku Klux Klan uniform was displayed from a dor-
mitory window.100
In response to these incidents and attendant pressure from stu-
dents, faculty, and legislators, the school instituted a code of
conduct that targeted stigmatization, harassment, and intimidation
on various protected grounds, including race, religion, sex, and
sexual orientation in “educational and academic centers.”101 The
policy varied liability and sanctions based on the nature and
location of the violation, and it excluded school-sponsored publica-
tions from coverage.102
A psychology graduate student sued claiming that his discussion
of scientific theories implicating racial and sex differences might
expose him to sanction, and he won.103 The district court noted a
number of constraints that the government may permissibly impose
on speech acts, including those predicated on conduct such as
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
99. See 721 F. Supp. 852, 854, 856-57 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
100. Id. at 854.
101. Id. at 856.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 853-54, 858.
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discrimination,104 imminent lawlessness,105 fighting words,106 and
obscenity,107 as well as time, place, and manner restrictions.108 The
opinion goes on, however, to say that “[w]hat the University [cannot]
do ... [is] establish an anti-discrimination policy which ha[s] the
effect of prohibiting certain speech because it disagree[s] with ideas
or messages sought to be conveyed.”109 The court did not suggest
that a university has different rights or immunities by virtue of its
status as an educational institution, but it did suggest some
additional obligations. Citing Sweezy, the court wrote that “[t]hese
principles acquire a special significance in the university setting,
where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is
essential to the institution’s educational mission.”110
The notion that universities have special duties to permit
unfettered speech seems to me quite wrong, as is the use of Sweezy
to support that proposition. Taking the second point first, Sweezy
was, as noted, a case about the academic freedom of the university
and its faculty. The university—in that case, a public one—was the
regulated entity, and other, more coercive state institutions were
the regulators.111 What academic freedom means is that it is not for
the government—including a court—to decide what is “essential to
the [school’s] educational mission.”112 There is a suggestion in the
Doe case that the university adopted its code of conduct under
threat of defunding by the legislature.113 It would be consistent with
Sweezy to say that the legislature is constitutionally forbidden from
104. See id. at 861.
105. See id. at 862-63 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
106. See id. at 862 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
107. See id. at 863 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
108. See id. (citing Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
109. Id. There is some unacknowledged tension in this formulation. Antidiscrimination
law is predicated on the government holding a view about which messages are and are not
appropriate for private individuals to convey. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1737 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that it
impermissibly violates neutrality to scrutinize the anti-gay views of a religious claimant more
closely than the anti-homophobic views of a secular one).
110. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
111. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 236.
112. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967);
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“The Law
School’s educational judgment that ... diversity is essential to its educational mission is one
to which we defer.”).
113. See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854.
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making good on that threat. It would not be consistent with Sweezy
to say that the university itself cannot forbid certain forms of
discriminatory speech based on its own determination that such
speech is inconsistent with its educational mission.
The broader proposition that a university is a special site for
unabashed freedom of speech is an inheritance of the 1960s.114
Yiannopoulos picked on Berkeley for a reason. Most obvious is the
campus’s famously progressive orientation.115 It could be expected
that Berkeley students would react strongly to his presence—be
“triggered,” in contemporary (often pejorative) parlance—and
eliciting such reactions is Yiannopoulos’s raison d’etre.116 But
Berkeley’s symbolism as the host of a putative “free speech week”
also owes a debt to its history in relation to freedom of speech
specifically.117 Berkeley was the home of the Free Speech Movement,
the student-led uprising that galvanized university student activism
in the mid-1960s.118
College campuses had a very different reputation before that
movement. Indeed, in 1964, officially recognized student groups
were not allowed to address off-campus issues on Berkeley’s cam-
pus.119 In protest of that ban, thousands of Berkeley students
occupied an administration building, picketed, and engaged in sit-
ins and other forms of civil disobedience.120 The Free Speech
Movement was the model for mass activism on college campuses
later in the decade, particularly in response to the Vietnam War.121
When commentators today tie college campuses to unfettered
114. See generally THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: REFLECTIONS ON BERKELEY IN THE 1960S
(Robert Cohen & Reginald E. Zelnik eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT].
115. See Emily Deruy, UC Berkeley Tries to Reclaim Its Free Speech Legacy, MERCURY
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2017, 4:56 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/24/uc-berkeley-tries-
to-reclaim-its-free-speech-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/7C8Y-DSE3].
116. See Dan Lieberman, Milo Yiannopoulos Is Trying to Convince Colleges that Hate
Speech Is Cool, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/02/us/milo-
yiannopoulos-ivory-tower/index.html [https://perma.cc/FL9W-LJR6].
117. See Steinmetz, supra note 85.
118. See THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT, supra note 114.
119. See Leon F. Litwack, Preface to THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT, supra note 114, at xiii;
Deruy, supra note 115.
120. See Robert Cohen, This Was Their Fight and They Had to Fight It: The FSM’s
Nonradical Rank and File, in THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT, supra note 114, at 227-28.
121. See Leon Wofsy, When the FSM Disturbed the Faculty Peace, in THE FREE SPEECH
MOVEMENT, supra note 114, at 350-52.
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freedom of speech, they are reflecting the legacy of the Free Speech
Movement.122
But important as the movement was to its historical moment, the
values it represents are not inherent in the mission of an institution
of higher education. Indeed, that mission is, if anything, antithetical
to the idea of campuses as free speech zones.123 The purpose of a
university is to prepare students for citizenship. Universities do so
by curating speech; that is, by discriminating with regard to the
content and viewpoint of the speech to which students are exposed
consistent with the pedagogical judgments of faculty and adminis-
trators.
Begin with admissions. Campus classrooms, auditoriums, and
other spaces are typically restricted to members of the university
community except to the degree the school chooses, for its own
reasons, to make them accessible to the broader public.124 Students
belong to that community by virtue of the fact that they have been
selected for admission to the school. A typical college or university
does not choose students randomly or indiscriminately. Rather, it
makes a judgment about which students are prepared for the
school’s curriculum, have the potential to succeed within it, are
likely to donate to the school or generate revenue through athletics
or other extracurricular activities, or will contribute to the educa-
tional experiences of other students.125 As the Supreme Court has
122. See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education and the PC Narrative, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 1987, 2003-04 (2017) (collecting sources linking freedom of speech to college
campuses). As Frederick Schauer writes, First Amendment claims within the popular culture
extend beyond what doctrine protects: “Academics even at private universities frame their
pleas for academic freedom in the language of the First Amendment, just as students at those
universities who feel their speech has been restricted make explicit recourse to the First
Amendment in articulating their complaints.” Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld’s First Amendment,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914, 921 (2008). 
123. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 702 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“The campus is ... a world apart from the public square in numerous respects.”).
124. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (“A university differs in specific
respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A
university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's
authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its
campus and facilities.”); Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A
university’s] essential function is not to provide a forum for general public expression and
assembly; rather, the university campus is an enclave created for the pursuit of higher
learning by its admitted and registered students and by its faculty.”).
125. See Judy Mandell, What College Admissions Officers Say They Want in a Candidate,
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recognized in the context of race-based affirmative action cases, this
last factor in particular incorporates judgments about the perspec-
tives students will bring to discussion both inside and outside the
classroom.126 In other words, universities engage in viewpoint
discrimination in admitting students, and they do so pervasively.
We need not assume that schools are partisan in their choices,
though some may be, but merely that they are attentive to the mix
of perspectives students offer and the likely quality of their
contribution to the classroom.
Let us not mince words. A student who is demonstrably brilliant
but demonstrably racist can and should be denied admission to a
university, public or private. Should that racism emerge after the
student is admitted, he or she can and should face discipline or
possibly expulsion. The judgment that such a student does not
belong in a university community is, of course, in part a matter of
communicating and demonstrating respect for other students within
the community (if not shielding them from actual abuse), but it also
reflects a distinctively academic judgment about the quality of that
student’s contribution to university life. Racist views are worse than
non-racist ones, all else equal. Academic freedom includes the
freedom of a university to act on that judgment. Paul Horwitz gets
it just right when he says that even if, in general, “government
should be barred from making judgments about the value of
particular speech acts based on the content of the speech,” doing so
“is exactly the job of universities: to judge student speech on its
merits—and, often, to find it wanting.”127
Apart from admissions, the most obvious way in which schools
engage in viewpoint discrimination at their very core is in the
selection of faculty. Faculty are chosen, ideally, on the basis of their
professional quality. Faculty recruitment and retention rewards
expertise, creativity, and quality of argument. Faculty who advance
and defend outrageous, unsupported, or offensive arguments are
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/parenting/wp/2016/08/30/
what-21-college-admissions-officers-say-they-want-in-a-candidate/ [https://perma.cc/4HYN-
U2UX].
126. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208, 2210 (2016) (citing Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (quoting
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 264, 313, 318-19 (1978)); Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
127. PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 115 (2013).
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routinely and appropriately denied positions or refused tenure.128
Needless to say, faculty hiring is an imperfect process, but some of
its failings reflect precisely the cost of granting educational in-
stitutions significant discretion to choose their educators. Brilliant
but racist or misogynistic faculty members, like students who share
these qualities, should not be invited into university communities.
Of course, part of preparing students for democratic citizenship
might well include preparing them to be autonomous moral agents,
to engage in self-fulfilling activities, to exercise expressive license,
and to tolerate the divergent or even repugnant views of others. But
cultivating these traits might or might not entail allowing their
unfettered exercise on campus.129 Moreover, the university’s mission
also includes other aspects of education, including conferring
substantive knowledge and helping students to develop empathy,
live within a community governed by social norms, and learn to
persuade others through argument rather than overwhelm them
through offense.130 Excluding some speakers on the basis of the
content of or views expressed within their speech is not just some-
thing a university might do to make its students feel better or to
prevent emotional or psychological harm to them (though it is those
things also); it is a school’s affirmative calling.
That calling is more urgent in the current information environ-
ment. It is not difficult for students to gain exposure to a wide range
of ideas. The Internet, books, magazines, television, and social
media perform this task very well. What is difficult, rather, is for
students to discern valuable information from information that is
ill-informed or is tailored to distract or mislead its recipients. A
university’s decision not to permit carnival barkers or racist speak-
ers on campus is intimately consistent with its role in a democratic
society. We need curating more than ever, and universities are the
institutions that have long served that function.
128. But see Josie Glausiusz, Tenure Denial, and How Early-Career Researchers Can
Survive It, NATURE (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00219-5
[https://perma.cc/TYL8-SVWG] (explaining that some faculty may be denied tenure based on
discrimination).
129. See Horwitz, supra note 127, at 113 (“Universities are not a free or unregulated
marketplace of ideas, although the regulations are internal rather than external. They are
laboratories for democracy, not laboratories of democracy: they contribute to democratic
discourse, but not by following its rules.”).
130. See Goldberg, supra note 14, at 168-69.
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IV. UNIVERSITIES AS SPEECH LABORATORIES
The upshot is that courts should give leeway to both public and
private universities to define and execute their academic missions
as they see fit.131 It is not that those missions must include speech
codes or must exclude campus speakers on the basis of their
viewpoints. Rather, the claim is that these decisions should be made
on the merits and not in the long shadow of the First Amendment.
Let us return to the idea of constitutional moral hazard. It refers
to the incentive to indulge in constitutionally protected acts because
of the fact of rights enforcement. The acts that rights protect impose
costs on others, but the conferral of a right disables the government
from requiring the actor to bear those costs. In the absence of rights
enforcement, those costs can—following Arrow—be contained either
through direct regulation of the actor, through private regulation by
intermediary parties in a position to exercise leverage, or through
social norms.132 Unmitigated enforcement of campus speech rights
prevents regulation of speakers by the government and disem-
powers universities—the most natural intermediaries—from
intervening.133 And it influences social norms of civility and persua-
sion in the wrong direction by encouraging students to invest their
arguments with the polarizing, zero-sum language of rights. Free
speech protection reduces the incentive to persuade skeptics and
clouds our thinking about whether and under what circumstances
provocative speech is actually a good idea.
The merits argument in favor of applying a light touch to campus
speech regulation is powerful. Most significant to my mind is
inculcating the value of tolerance.134 Living in a pluralistic society
means being surrounded by people holding views that one disagrees
131. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 702 (2010) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (“As a general matter, courts should respect universities’ judgments and let them
manage their own affairs.”).
132. See Arrow, supra note 37, at 538.
133. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech Is Protected Free Speech, Even on College
Campuses, VOX (Dec. 26, 2017, 4:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/165
24832/campus-free-speech-first-amendment-protest [https://perma.cc/68RU-3BMX] (arguing
that even hate speech is protected by the First Amendment, but that colleges can take steps
like regulating when and where speech takes place).
134. See generally BOLLINGER, supra note 20.
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with.135 Democratic politics requires engagement with such people:
to negotiate compromises, to develop empathy for them as fellow
community members and human beings, and to accept the basic
legitimacy of their position when it is politically ascendant.
University campuses are often dominated by large majorities who
share similar politics and can encourage groupthink.136 Growing into
citizenship within a silo of this sort can ill-prepare students for the
real world.
Relatedly, even if one believes that universities should nonethe-
less distinguish racist or intentionally provocative speakers from
those who, say, are seeking to expose students to challenging aca-
demic theories, drawing this line is difficult in practice. Racist or
sexist theories can be couched in misleading or pseudoscientific
terms, and well-supported research can have disturbing implica-
tions for racial or gender equality. The administrators making these
judgments can be ill-informed or biased, often in ways that are
themselves subject to academic contestation. As Heidi Kitrosser
writes, “the very nature of the social prejudices that critical
theorists describe—specifically, their manifold and deeply ingrained
ubiquity—makes the task of line-drawing between actionable and
permissible speech content intrinsically precarious.”137
As noted, regulating campus speech can fall felicitously into the
hands of the speakers one wishes most to regulate. A prior restraint
calls attention to the targeted speakers. The National Socialist
Party, the neo-Nazi group that famously proposed to march in
Skokie, Illinois, a town with an unusually large population of
Holocaust survivors, received no greater gift than the efforts of both
Chicago and Skokie to prevent them from marching.138 Indeed,
135. See Goldberg, supra note 14, at 166-67 (“One might argue that safeguarding this
space, where views can not only be expressed but also challenged, takes on special importance
at a time when surrounding communities are polarized and many people are increasingly
reluctant to engage with views contrary to their own.”).
136. Those politics are often, but by no means always, on the left side of the political
spectrum. See Christopher Ingraham, The Dramatic Shift Among College Professors That’s
Hurting Students’ Education, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. com/
news/wonk/wp/2016/01/11/the-dramatic-shift-among-college-professors-thats-hurting-
students-education/ [https://perma.cc/F4YE-XFUD] (arguing that college professors have
become more liberal since 1990, but that the increase has not been as dramatic among
students).
137. Kitrosser, supra note 122, at 2038.
138. See DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE
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despite the group’s court victories eventually leading to a march
permit, the Skokie march never took place.139 For provocateurs,
their objective is not primarily to engage with students on a
particular campus but rather to generate publicity for themselves
and their larger cause. “What are they afraid of?,” they can say of a
school that prevents them from speaking, thereby lending unearned
legitimacy to their substantive positions.140 Apart from the
Yiannopouloses and Spencers of the world, the boorish behavior—
epithets, harassment, and the like—that often gets swept up in
speech codes (frequently under the influence of alcohol) should be
universally condemned but instead receives a principled constitu-
tional defense. Kitrosser cites a 1993 Los Angeles Times article on
the “speech code” at the University of Wisconsin that puts the point
succinctly: “Invoked arbitrarily, without consistency or logic, it had
made First Amendment martyrs out of drunken yahoos.”141
The merits case in favor of some speech restrictions on campus is
also a strong one. Most prominent, of course, is the school’s educa-
tional mission and its role as curator of speech, as discussed. The
school’s role is not just to support experimentation but to encourage
civility and to emphasize the role of persuasion in democratic
discourse. It amplifies this point to note that the publicity runs in
both directions. A poorly supported argument can acquire some heft
simply from its setting at a university. “Put another way,” Goldberg
writes, “providing these speakers with a college or university
platform can elevate pseudoscience, debunked methodologies, or
falsified historical accounts to students who do not have the
knowledge or training to doubt the views being advanced.”142 And
the argument that restrictions on speakers can provide a larger
platform than permitting them to speak can be overstated in the
FIRST AMENDMENT 1-2 (1985).
139. See id.
140. See Goldberg, supra note 14, at 170. Yiannopoulos’s announcement of “free speech
week” after he was deterred from speaking at Berkeley served his publicity ends far better
than they would have been served had he simply delivered his remarks without incident.
141. Barry Siegel, Fighting Words: It Seemed Like a Noble Idea—Regulating Hateful
Language. But When the University of Wisconsin Tried, Its Good Intentions Collided with the
First Amendment, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-03-28/
magazine/tm-15949_1_fighting-word/6 [https://perma.cc/V9ZD-VPPT]; see also Kitrosser,
supra note 122, at 2008 (citing id.).
142. Goldberg, supra note 14, at 182.
248 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:223
current social media environment, in which the imprimatur of
institutional intermediaries such as universities can enable a
speaker to rise above the cacophony of voices competing for audience
attention.143
It is also not to be overlooked, of course, that permitting racists
on campus imposes harm on students. There is the expressive harm
of their university’s stamp on speech that demeans or belittles many
of its students.144 There is the burden in time and energy of having
to defend against, rebut, or protest claims that stigmatize them, a
cost minority students bear to a far greater degree than majority
students.145 There is the emotional harm to students who hear and
are offended by racist speech.146 These harms are not actionable
under the First Amendment, and this Essay does not suggest they
should be, but we should not let the discourse of rights blind us to
the fact that they are indeed harms.147 It goes without saying that
a university generally should have the capacity to protect its
students from injury.
And so the case for permitting racist speakers on campus is
certainly not an obvious one. Reasonable people, all of whom
support liberal values and constitutional democracy, can and do
disagree about whether it is appropriate on the merits. Different
schools can and should therefore implement different policies with
respect to offensive campus speech by both students and other
campus speakers. Policies can vary along any number of dimen-
sions: the specific acts covered, the severity of those acts, the level
of sanction imposed, the nature of any approval or hearing process,
the structure and composition of the administrative decision-making
body, the degree of autonomy granted to student groups, how to reg-
ulate counterspeech, and policies respecting security arrangements
and especially how those arrangements are funded or insured.
This last subject of variation is of special importance for universi-
ties. As noted, the first Yiannopoulos appearance at Berkeley ended
143. See generally TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE
OUR HEADS (2016).
144. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 760-62 (1998).
145. See Louwanda Evans & Wendy Leo Moore, Impossible Burdens: White Institutions,
Emotional Labor, and Micro-Resistance, 62 SOC. PROBS. 439, 452 (2015).
146. See id. at 448.
147. See BOLLINGER, supra note 20, at 39.
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up costing $100,000 in property damage, and the school committed
to paying $1 million in security for Yiannopoulos’s subsequent “Free
Speech Week.”148 Other universities may wish not to pay this ran-
som and prefer instead to deny controversial speakers a place at the
dais. Public schools who make that decision have good reason to fear
current doctrine, which seems to frown upon refusals to permit
someone to speak based on the likelihood of a hostile audience.149
But as Fred Schauer has pointed out, current doctrine is less clear
than it might appear:
We know that law enforcement must take all reasonable steps
before shutting down a speaker whose words have created a
dangerous situation, but we know little about what counts as
reasonable; what degree of deployment a police department is
required to use; and whether a local police department is
required to call upon county law enforcement, state law enforce-
ment, or state military (i.e., the National Guard) forces before
taking action against the speaker.150
A different approach to freedom of speech in this domain can en-
able variation in approaches to motivate a set of best practices.151
Opening up space for experimentation by localized institutions is
sometimes touted as a benefit of federalism at the level of constitu-
tional structure.152 Federalism is not as often given a role to play in
adjudicating constitutional rights in the United States. We have no
doctrine akin to the margin of appreciation that has developed at
the European Court of Human Rights and permits some room for
148. See Chason, supra note 84 and accompanying text.
149. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) (footnote
omitted) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.... Speech
cannot be ... punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”).
150. Frederick Schauer, The Hostile Audience Revisited, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Nov.
2, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/hostile-audience-revisited [https://perma.cc/36FY-
86S4]; see also Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1266 (1995) (“Although this focus on ‘listeners' reaction’ could be a powerful and far-reaching
principle, it is not at all clear what it means.”).
151. Best practices guidance is needed for both public and private universities, which have
much more in common with each other than public schools have in common with other
governmental bodies.
152. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Lucy D. Bickford, Federalism and Subsidiarity:
Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 123, 129-30
(James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds. 2014).
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Council of Europe member states to develop human rights law in
accordance with local democratic conditions.153 The absence of any
such doctrine in American law may be explained in part by the
legacy of Brown v. Board of Education.154 Southern legislators and
school boards followed the decision with a campaign of “massive re-
sistance” that emphasized the connection between education and
local autonomy.155 But local autonomy in the service of policy var-
iation around racist speech on campus is simply not the same when
it is instead in the service of legally enforced white supremacy.
It is instructive in this regard to note that the movement in favor
of campus speech codes dissipated primarily due to self-regulation
rather than court decisions.156 Schools are governed by their own
internal norms and face pressure from their own internal eco-
systems of faculty, administrators, and students, not to mention
external pressure from politicians, citizens, or the demands of a
competitive educational market.157 Overzealous enforcement of
speech restrictions generates resistance, and there is little reason
to think that such resistance is unlikely to be effective in this space.
CONCLUSION
Moral hazard enables the insured to take advantage of infor-
mation asymmetries in insurance markets. Constitutional moral
hazard enables rights holders to take advantage of asymmetries in
constitutional rights. In either case, moral hazard induces a
departure from the socially optimal allocation of resources. In the
constitutional domain, even if we believe strong enforcement of
constitutional rights is necessary for reasons of morality or posi-
tive constitutional law, it must be conceded that rights enforce-
ment imposes costs and that rights enforcement itself induces
regulated parties to engage in additional costly behavior. The
presence of moral hazard is not a reason not to pursue strong rights
153. See Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-
Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in FEDERALISM
AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 152, at 390-97.
154. See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
155. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 150-73 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
156. See Kitrosser, supra note 122, at 2005-06.
157. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Penn Is Abandoning Speech Code: ‘Water Buffalo’ Epithet Led
to Racial Harassment Charge, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at A1.
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enforcement, just as it is not a reason not to insure people against
harm. But it is a reason to think carefully about the costs moral
hazard imposes in particular contexts, and whether it is possible or
desirable to mitigate those costs.
We can expect provocative campus speech to be unusually
susceptible to constitutional moral hazard. It is often cheap to
produce, and many of its costs—offense to targets, negative
publicity, and preventive security measures—are not just borne by
third parties but, in fact, are the purpose of the speech acts. We can
expect provocative campus speech protected through rights enforce-
ment to occur at a considerably higher rate—with the attendant
social loss—than it would occur under mechanisms of direct
regulation, intermediary regulation, or social norms.
The appropriateness of this blunt approach is questionable.
Colleges and universities, whether public or private, are not best
conceived as free speech zones. Universities exert control over the
speech environment from the moment of admission for their own
academic and pedagogical purposes, and they have enjoyed a
measure of constitutional protection in making those choices.
Especially in the current information environment, we should view
colleges as models not for how to speak freely but for how to speak
well.
